May 15 2026
On 14 May 2026, the shareholders of Ferretti met to elect a new board of directors for the group. Two camps were pitted against each other: on one side, Weichai, Ferretti’s long-standing largest shareholder with a 39.5 per cent stake; on the other, KKCG Maritime Investments, the holding company of Czech billionaire Karel Komarek, who in recent months had become the Chinese group’s main European opponent.
Following the vote, the list backed by Weichai secured 52.3 per cent of the votes. This result enabled the Chinese group to appoint eight representatives to the new board of directors and to take effective control of the Italian manufacturer’s governance. Immediately after the vote, Alberto Galassi, who had been chief executive for twelve years, stepped down from his post.
This shift brings to an end a period that began in 2012, when Weichai acquired a stake in Ferretti to save the company from a critical financial situation. At the time, the global market for large yachts had just been hit by the fallout from the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Ferretti was heavily in debt and needed to restructure its business.
The Chinese group had then injected several hundred million euros to recapitalise the Italian company. For more than a decade, this partnership had enabled the builder to return to solid growth. Under the leadership of Alberto Galassi, Ferretti had restored its profit margins, developed its brands and strengthened its presence in the American, Middle Eastern and Asian markets.
Today, Ferretti controls seven major brands in the global boating industry: Riva, Pershing, Itama, CRN, Custom Line, Wally and Ferretti Yachts. The group owns seven manufacturing sites in Italy, mainly located in Emilia-Romagna, the Marche and Liguria. It also relies on a network of several hundred Italian subcontractors specialising in composite materials, marine electronics, high-end cabinetmaking and hydraulic systems.
By 2025, Ferretti had exceeded €1.2 billion in turnover and was among the world leaders in the luxury yacht segment for vessels over 24 metres. The group also enjoyed strong profitability thanks to the move upmarket of its models and sustained demand in the American and Asian markets.
But behind these financial results, tensions between Weichai and the Italian management had been mounting for several months.
According to several Italian media outlets, the Chinese representatives criticised Alberto Galassi for retaining too much independent control over the group’s strategy and for gradually sidelining representatives from Weichai from operational decisions. The conflict centred in particular on internal appointments, board governance and the group’s future direction.
The replacement of Alberto Galassi by Stassi Anastassov marks a significant shift in Ferretti’s management philosophy. Anastassov is a former executive at Procter & Gamble, having previously worked at Duracell, amongst others. Unlike Galassi, who hails from the Italian industrial and boating sectors, he has the profile of an international manager more focused on managing large, globalised organisations.
The Chinese takeover immediately triggered a reaction from KKCG Maritime Investments.
The Czech group had, however, itself significantly strengthened its position in Ferretti a few months earlier. In early 2026, KKCG had increased its stake from 14.5% to 23.23% of the share capital through a transaction estimated at 115 million euros.
This increase in its shareholding was clearly aimed at preventing Weichai from gaining sole control over the Italian group’s governance.
Following the general meeting on 14 May, KKCG publicly denounced a possible “concerted action” between several Chinese investors who had recently acquired stakes in Ferretti. The Czech group suspects these investors of having coordinated their purchases in order to indirectly strengthen Weichai’s control.
KKCG also claims that certain transparency obligations applicable to listed companies may not have been complied with. The Czech conglomerate has therefore officially asked the Italian government to examine the transaction under the so-called “golden power” mechanism.
This mechanism allows the Italian state to intervene in companies considered strategic to national interests. In particular, Rome may impose conditions on certain transactions or even exercise a right of veto.
The main argument put forward by KKCG centres on Ferretti’s defence activities. Although the group is primarily known for its luxury yachts, it also produces certain high-speed vessels for the Italian security forces and government agencies.
The Italian Minister for Industry, Adolfo Urso, has confirmed that KKCG’s application is now being examined by the relevant departments within the Ministries of Industry and Defence.
This potential intervention by the Italian state shows that the Ferretti case now extends far beyond the simple issue of corporate governance.
For the real issue at stake is control of an industrial asset considered to be strategic.
Ferretti is today one of the symbols of Italian expertise in high-end yachting. The group’s brands are built on a combination of Italian design, naval engineering, handcrafted interiors and advanced marine technologies. The vessels produced by Riva, Pershing and Wally are among the global benchmarks in the sector.
The group employs several thousand people directly in Italy and supports a vast regional industrial network. A significant part of Ferretti’s value lies precisely in this concentration of local expertise: naval architecture, upholstery, precious woods, propulsion systems, electronic integration and composite materials.
The problem for Italy is therefore twofold.
On the one hand, Ferretti owes much of its financial recovery to the capital injected by Weichai since 2012. Without this Chinese investment, the group would probably have found it much harder to survive the global financial crisis.
On the other hand, the effective takeover of the group by a Chinese state-owned entity is raising growing questions about Italy’s ability to retain control over its strategic companies.
This issue is all the more sensitive given that Weichai is not a conventional private investor. The Chinese group is part of the state-owned industrial ecosystem of Shandong province and maintains close ties with the Chinese authorities.
The Ferretti case thus illustrates a broader trend observed in Europe for several years: Chinese industrial groups are seeking to establish a foothold in sectors of high technological and symbolic value — such as the automotive, robotics, luxury goods, infrastructure and maritime industries.
The Italian yachting industry is now, in turn, being affected by this trend.
The case also reveals the limitations of the model implemented at Ferretti since 2012. For over a decade, the company operated on an implicit compromise: funding came from China whilst operational control remained largely Italian.
The vote on 14 May brings an end to this balance.
From now on, Weichai is no longer content merely to be the group’s main financier.
The Chinese conglomerate also directly controls its governance and executive management.
It is precisely this development that is causing concern amongst some in Italian industrial and political circles. For in the luxury and high-end sectors, the issue is not solely about the location of factories. It also concerns control over brands, strategic decisions, innovation and international image.
Ferretti may retain its shipyards in Italy whilst gradually seeing its decision-making centres move outside the country.
This is the crux of the ambiguity surrounding this deal: production remains Italian, but control is gradually shifting to Chinese hands.
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